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Abstract
Holmlund & Lindén (1993) analyse the usage of relief employment using a matching model with
three stocks – regular employment, relief employment, and unemployment. In their model, the
usage of relief jobs has both a direct effect on unemployment (i.e., the placement effect) as well as
an indirect wage effect on unemployment. The former relationship is negative. The latter effect
refers to the change in wage setting which is in response to changes in how relief jobs are used.
Holmlund & Lindén argue that the only usage of relief jobs which unequivocally reduces
unemployment is the policy of directing relief jobs at the flow out of regular employment. They
show that by using relief jobs in this way, the negative direct effect on unemployment is reinforced
by a negative indirect wage effect on unemployment. In this paper, we argue that Holmlund &
Lindén’s concept of workers’ fall-back position is mis-specified since it fails to take account of the
wage bargaining undertaken by those in relief employment. And it is this mis-specification which
drives their result. Once due consideration is made for those in relief employment, their result no
longer holds.
                                               
* Useful comments from Bertil Holmlund, Arthur van Soest, and  an  anonymous referee are gratefully
acknowledged.1 Introduction
In the post-war period, unemployment has been an important issue for many countries. With the
sharp rises in unemployment in the 1980s, and its persistence, this issue has become even more
central in political discussion. Why  is it  that some countries experience obscene levels of
unemployment whilst, at the same time, other countries seem to avoid the  adverse effects of
unemployment?
One country which has been the subject of much debate and analysis is Sweden. Why was it that in
the 1980s, when much of Europe was experiencing mass unemployment, Sweden maintained an
unemployment rate
1 which peaked at a mere 3.5% in 1983? The UK, for example, had an
unemployment  rate  which  peaked in the same year at a staggering 12.4%! What was the cause of
these huge differences? Could lessons be learnt from the Swedish experience? If so, how could
policy be changed to alleviate the problem of unemployment?
Whilst  there are many differences between the  Swedish and  British labour markets (see
Miller(1991) for a more-detailed discussion), one difference which was  often focused on was
Sweden’s extensive usage of relief jobs. Was Sweden’s low unemployment record due to her
unremitting application of relief jobs to the problem of unemployment? Or were other forces in
motion?
Holmlund & Lindén (H-L) provide a framework which attempts to answer the question of whether
the usage of relief jobs is guaranteed to reduce unemployment, or whether their usage induces
                                               
1  The unemployment rates  referred to here are standardised unemployment rates, as used by the OECD.indirect mechanisms into play which have deleterious effects regarding unemployment. Central to
their analysis, they argue – quite convincingly – that the usage of relief jobs has both a direct  effect
on unemployment (by taking someone from unemployment into a relief job; or by preventing a
worker who has lost their job from becoming unemployed), as well as an indirect wage effect on
unemployment. The latter effect refers to the likelihood that by introducing relief jobs into the
economy, the wage-setting mechanism is likely to be disturbed. And this disturbance in wage
setting affects unemployment. If this indirect effect on unemployment is positive, and stronger than
the direct effect of relief-job usage, then we would see a perverse situation where the usage of
relief jobs actually increases unemployment!
When we talk about relief jobs we refer to temporary jobs which the  government creates to
alleviate unemployment. The idea of lowering  the unemploym ent level by placing unemployed
workers in temporary public employment is not a new idea. Indeed, in the late 1920s, politicians
such as Lloyd George and Mosley , and economists such as Keynes, were already propagating
such ideas. Temporary public employment programmes have been used in various types of
political systems. Dictatorial countries such as Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy have used
them, as well as quasi-democratic countries such as Wilson’s America. However, the country most
noted for using relief jobs has been Sweden in the post-war epoch.
In H-L’s model, relief jobs can be used in two different ways. Firstly, relief jobs can be directed at
those already in unemployment; and, secondly, relief jobs can be given to those workers flowing
from regular employment, i.e. workers being laid-off from regular jobs. In their model, the usage
of relief jobs has both a direct effect on unemployment (i.e. the placement effect) as well as anindirect wage effect on unemployment. The former relationship is negative. The latter effect refers
to the change in wage setting which is in response to changes in how relief jobs are used. Wage
setting is assumed to be the result of a Nash bargain between individual workers and firms. Since
the usage of relief jobs affects the average difference in value between regular employment and the
worker’s outside option, the wage will be affected. If this effect is positive, then the indirect wage
effect on unemployment will be positive, and vice versa.
According to H-L, the only usage of relief jobs which has both a negative direct effect on
unemployment and a negative indirect wage effect on unemployment is the policy of directing
relief jobs at the outflow from regular employment. Thus the policy of directing relief jobs at those
flowing out of regular employment has an unequivocally negative effect on unemployment. The
policy of directing relief jobs at the unemployed, on the other hand, has a negative direct effect on
unemployment  but  a positive  indirect effect on unemployment due  to reducing the average
difference in value between regular employment and unemployment. Thus this use of relief jobs
encourages more-aggressive wage bargaining by workers. However, the specification of the
average worker’s fall-back position which H-L use is incorrect
2 since it fails to take account of
those in relief jobs - workers who are also involved in wage bargaining. We show that once due
consideration is made for those in relief employment, the policy of directing relief jobs at the flow
out of regular employment also has an ambiguous wage effect on unemployment and thus an
ambiguous effect on unemployment.
                                               
2  Their concept of the average fall-back position of workers is a special case of the measure of average fall-back
position which we propose in this paper. Their concept is correct only if either relief workers do not search and/or if
there are no workers in relief employment.2 The model
H-L’s model is a matching model where the  search process is  summarised by an aggregate
matching function  () Hh S V = , , where S is the number of searchers and V is the number of
vacancies.  H is increasing in both its arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale. The number
of searchers is given as the number of unemployed plus the effective number of searchers in relief
jobs, i.e. SUc R º+ , where U and R are the number of unemployed and the number of relief
workers, respectively. Search effectiveness is captured by the parameter c, where 0 1 ££ c . Since
relief workers are employed in full-time jobs, they search less intensively than the unemployed. We
further assume that those in regular employment (E) do not search.
There are L individuals in the exogenously given labour force. The rates of regular employment,
relief employment, and  unemployment,  are given as eE L º , r R L º , and uU L º ,
respectively. Since the labour force comprises of those in regular  employment, those in relief
employment, and those in unemployment, we have the following identity: 1º++ eru . The
vacancy rate is given as vV L º . The variable qºVS  represents labour market tightness and
qH V º  represents the rate at which vacant jobs are filled. By the constant returns to scale
assumption, we have  () () () qh S Vh qq º= ,, 1 1 1 , where  () ¢< q q0. The flow of new hires into
regular jobs is given as HS =a , where  () ()() aq q == HV VS q . We see that  () ¢> aq 0 since
() aq q = h 11 , ; thus  () aq = h 1, , where  () h×  is an increasing function.
Regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process, with arrival rates that are exogenous to
the individual worker. The arrival rate for an unemployed worker is a , whilst for a relief worker itis  ca . Therefore, the arrival rate in general is higher for an unemployed searcher than for a relief
worker, since  those in unemployment search more intensively than those in relief jobs. The
unemployed may also exit to relief jobs. Relief job offers arrive according to a Poisson process
with parameter g . There is an exogenously given rate f  at which regular jobs break up, and a
government-determined rate l  at which relief jobs expire. A worker separated from a regular job
can enter into a relief job with probability m , or enter directly into unemployment with probability
() 1 -m . Relief jobs are considered to be temporary and we thus assume that the rate at which









In Figure 1, the boxes E, R, and U, refer to the stocks of regular employment, relief employment,
and unemployment, respectively, whilst the arrows represent the flows between the stocks. In the
steady state, the numbers flowing into a given stock equal the numbers flowing out of the said
stock. With that in mind, we write down the following steady-state equations for regular
employment and relief employment:[1] () ( ) ( ) fa q 1 -- = + ur uc r
[2] () [] () cr uu r aq l g m f += + - - 1
(From the identity 1º++ eru , we let eu r º-- 1  in the equations.)
Equations [1] and [2] determine u and r, given q . In order to determine q , we have to consider
the determination of vacancies and wages. All regular jobs are equally productive. For the firm, an
occupied job has an expected value of Jor  if the worker entered from relief employment, and  Jou
if the worker entered from unemployment. The expected value of a vacant job is Jv. The discount
rate is denoted by d , y is the constant marginal product, wcr  is the wage cost to the firm of a
worker who entered the job from a relief job, wcu is the wage cost to the firm of a worker who
entered the job from unemployment, and k is the cost of maintaining a vacancy. The wage rates are
related to the wage cost via the identity  () ww t cr u ru , , º+ 1 , where t is the payroll tax.  Jor , Jou , and
Jv satisfy the following equations:
[3] () df Jy w J J oc v o rr r =- + -
[4] () df Jy w J J oc v o uu u =- + -




r =a  and q
u
v
u =a .A job occupied by a worker who entered the wage bargain from a relief job yields a per-period
surplus of  yw c r -  and is turned into a vacant job at the rate f ; worker separations from this job
are associated with a capital loss of JJ vo r - . A job occupied by a worker who entered the wage
bargain from unemployment on the other hand yields a per-period surplus of  yw c u -  and is turned
into a vacant job at the rate f ; worker separations from this job are associated with a capital loss
of  JJ vo u - . The cost of a vacancy per period is k, and vacancies become occupied at the rate qr
by workers from relief jobs and qu  by workers from unemployment. Vacancies are kept open as
long as their yield is positive. In equilibrium,  Jv = 0. The value of a job occupied by a worker
who entered from a relief job is obtained from [3] as  () () Jy w oc rr =- + df , whilst the value of a
job occupied by a worker who entered from unemployment is obtained from [4]  as









where  () () w uw crw u cr cc c ur º+ +  is the average wage cost in the economy.
This is the average zero-profit condition for firms. The left-hand side is the average present value
of profits per worker, whilst the right-hand side is the expected present value of the firm’s hiring
cost. Labour market tightness influences decisions on vacancies by affecting hiring costs; the
tighter the labour market, the costlier it is to hire due to the longer duration of vacancies.Wages are determined by a Nash bargain. The firm’s disagreement point is the value of a vacant
job, whilst the worker’s threat point is the value of either being unemployed or the value of being
in a relief job. Since the wage bargains are undertaken between individual firms and individual
workers, there are essentially two types of Nash bargain in the economy. This is in stark contrast
to H-L who completely ignore the wage bargaining undertaken by relief workers, concentrating
solely on bargaining between unemployed workers and firms.
We letL er  and L eu  denote expected discounted lifetime income for  workers in regular
employment  who have entered their job from relief work and workers who have entered their job
from unemployment, respectively. L u denotes the value of unemployment, whilst L r  denotes the
value of being in a relief job. The value functions can be written as
[7] () () () dm f m f LL L L L er u e r e r i ir i r i w =+ - - + - 1
[8] () () () dm f m f LL L L L eu u e r e u i iu i u i w =+ - - + - 1
[9] () () dr a l LL L L L rr e ur wc
rr =+ -+ -
[10] () () dra g LL L L L uu e u r u w
u =+ - + -
where  () () () () [] LL L L L er u e r e rr r w =+ - - + - 11 dm f m f  is the value to the worker of a job
anywhere in the  economy  which was  entered from  relief employment, whilst
() () () () [] LL L L L eu u e r e uu u w =+ - - + - 11 dm f m f  is the value of a job anywhere in theeconomy which was entered from unemployment. wr  and wu refer to the wages of workers in
regular employment who entered the job from relief employment and unemployment respectively,
whilst w refers to the average wage in the economy. A worker employed by firm i receives the
wage rate wri  if they entered the job from relief employment, and wui  if they entered the job from
unemployment. All workers are separated from their job at the rate f . A worker exiting from their
job has probability m  of entering a relief job and probability () 1 -m  of entering unemployment.
Pay in relief employment is linked to the average wage in the economy via the replacement ratio
r r, whilst unemployment benefits are linked to the  average wage in the economy  via  the
replacement ratio r u.
The Nash bargain between a relief worker and the firm solves the following:
() () [] () [] max wr e rr o r v r i ir i ir i i ww J w J WL L º- -
- bb 1
where 0 1 << b .
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form












where the equilibrium conditions ww rr i =  and Jv = 0 are imposed. For  these workers, the
outside option, should the wage bargain not result in employment, is the value of relief
employment, i.e. L r . As can be seen, any policy that reduces the difference in value between
working and the outside option, LL er r - , will increase wcrThe Nash bargain between an unemployed worker and the firm solves the following:
() () [] () [] max wu e uu o u v u i iu i iu i i wwJ w J WL L º- -
- bb 1
where 0 1 << b .
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form












where the equilibrium conditions ww uu i =  and Jv = 0 are imposed. For  these workers, the
outside option, should the wage bargain not result in employment, is the value of unemployment,
i.e. L u . Again, any policy that reduces the difference in value between working and the outside
option, LL eu u - , will increase the wage cost wcu .
We can combine these two wage equations to gain a wage equation for the average wage in the
economy. By weighting wr  by the proportion of searchers in relief employment and wu by the
proportion of searchers in unemployment, we gain the following average wage equation:







































.L e refers to the average value of being in employment, whilst L fb is simply the average outside
option available to workers involved in wage bargaining.
From [1], [2], [7], [8], [9], [10], [14], and [15], we are able to gain an explicit expression for the
various differences in value between labour-market states in terms of the average wage rate, the
discount rate, the replacement ratios, and the transition rates:
[16] () () () () [] LL D eu u ru cw -=+ ++ - + - -
- dl ag r m fg r r 1
1
[17] () () () () [] LL D ru u r u cw -= - - - + + + -
- 11
1 ar d f a r r
[18] () () () {} () [] LL D er u ru w -=+ + + - - + + + - -
- dlag r dag m f r r 11
1
[19] () LL ef b gw -º × (see Appendix)
where  () ( ) () ( ) Dº + + + + + + + + - da l d f a g d fa a m f cc c 1.
By substituting [19] into [13] we obtain a relationship between the average wage and tightness.
Invoking [6] together with [13] and [19], we can write the equilibrium average wage equation as
[20]







bqa q 1; . . .
This equation determines the wage cost, given tightness. By expressing LL ef b -  as the average
wage multiplied by  () g × , we are able to gain an explicit expression for wc in terms of b , k,  () qq,
r r, r u, and the flow parameters of the model (see Appendix for the explicit expression). Note
that a  is the only flow parameter which is a function of q .The complete model is given by the wage equation [20], the zero-profit condition [6], and the two
steady-state equations [1] and [2]. [6] and [20] determine q  and wc. By substituting q  into [1]
and [2], we can determine u and r.
The model is illustrated in Figure 2. The top half shows the zero-profit condition [6] and the wage
equation [20] in () w c , q- space. The bottom half illustrates the relationship between
unemployment and tightness, obtained by substituting out r from [1] and [2]. H-L refer to this
curve as the “Beveridge curve”.
Figure 2.
 wc     wage setting
     zero-profit condition
       q
  Beveridge curve
    u
From Figure 2 it can be seen that the wage-setting curve slopes upwards. We can see from [20]
that q  appears in the denominator in both q and the value difference. As q  increases, both q and
the value difference fall; the result being that the average wage cost increases. The zero-profit
condition on the other hand is negatively sloped. The reason for this is that the higher the average
wage, the lower must be labour market tightness in order to yield zero profits (see Page 5).3 Comparative statics
The direct effect on unemployment of a change in either g  or m  is ug < 0 and um < 0,
respectively. In Figure 2, this would be seen as an upward shift of the Beveridge curve. Thus for a
given value of q  , unemployment will be lower. However, a change in a policy parameter will also
have an indirect wage effect on unemployment. This effect will alter the value of q . As uq < 0,
we would ideally like q  to increase as a result of the change in the policy parameter. Thus in
Figure 2, we would prefer to see the wage curve shift downwards, resulting in an increase in q .
From [20], we see that any policy that increases g reduces the wage cost. This has the effect of
increasing q . Therefore, we see that a change in a policy parameter influences the wage (and q )
according to the following relationship:












where  x is a policy parameter. Policies which have a negative indirect effect on unemployment
reinforce the direct negative effect on unemployment. Differentiating g with respect to g  and with








< 0 (see Appendix)
The wage is thus increased by intensified hiring of unemployed workers into relief jobs. The wage
effect of a policy that targets relief jobs at unemployment inflow m , on the other hand, has an
ambiguous wage effect. It is not certain that the indirect wage effect of directing relief jobs at the
flow out of regular employment will reinforce the direct effect. This is in sharp contrast to H-L
who, by failing to take into account the fact that relief workers are also wage bargainers, gain anegative wage effect which reinforces the  negative direct effect on  unemployment. Table 1
summarises these results:
Table 1
The Comparative Statics of Relief Jobs






m  ?  ?       –         ?        ?
g  +  –       –         +        ?
4 A Numerical Example
In this section, we undertake a numerical simulation, using the same parameter values as used by
H-L in their simulation. However, instead of analysing what happens when g is changed, we
analyse the results of a change in m . Table 2 shows what happens:
Table 2
u(%) r(%) e(%) v(%)  q Dv  Dr  Du    wc
Base run 5.00 0.00 95.00 1.96 0.39 3.9   – 10.0  100.0
  c = 0 4.50 9.66 85.84 1.77 0.39 3.9 21.4 10.0  99.99
 c = 0 5 . 2.75 5.28 91.98 1.77 0.33 3.7 10.9 11.1 100.16
  c = 1 2.24 3.87 93.88 1.68 0.27 3.4  7.9 12.4 100.32
In the base run,  no labour market programmes exist.  In the following three rows,  m=1.  The remaining
parameter values for each simulation are:   l=1 150;  g=0; f=0 00075 .;   d=005 365 .;   b=0546 . ;
r
r
= 1;  r
u
= 05 . . The cost of maintaining a vacancy k, is defined as  k w
c
= . The probability of filling
a job is defined as  q = - 0 025 04 .* . q . Dv , Dr , and Du refer to the average duration in weeks of vacancies,
relief jobs, and unemployment, respectively. The wage cost is normalised to 100 in the base run.As can be seen, the usage of relief jobs reduces the rate of unemployment in each simulation.
When c = 0, i.e. when H-L’s concept of fall-back position holds, we see that the wage is indeed
reduced as argued by H-L. However, when we have either c = 05 .  or c=1, i.e. when H-L’s
definition of fall-back position no longer holds, we see that this is no longer the case: the wage
increases in both examples.
5 Conclusion
H-L argue that relief jobs should be directed at the flow out of regular employment since this is the
only policy which has a negative indirect wage effect on unemployment which reinforces the
negative direct effect. As a result, unemployment is unequivocally reduced. This result stems from
their incorrect specification of fall-back position which only includes the value of being
unemployed. When due account is taken of those in relief jobs, we see that the policy of targeting
relief jobs at the flow out of employment also has ambiguous effects on unemployment.
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